The House has rejected the Senate amendment to HB-1007 which would eliminate all toll road corridors. The bill will now be heard by a joint conference committee tomorrow to see if they can arrive at an agreeable version. Considering the committee membership (Sens. Tapia, William, Cadman and Reps. Looper, McFadyen, Butcher) they will almost certainly strip the Wiens amendment out of the bill and send it back for a final vote. If that's how it goes we'll ask the house and senate to kill the bill and as a last resort we'll ask the Governor to veto it. The conference committee will be Weds.,
. in Room 0109.
According to a recent article in the Pueblo Chieftain Senator Abel Tapia was told by legislative lawyers that "any measure that effects laws retroactively is a guarantee for a lawsuit." It is unbelievable (almost) that legislative lawyers would give such a mistaken report and disappointing that the President Pro Tem of the Senate wouldn't know better. The legislature passes bills every year which act retroactively or impose new obligations. The Colorado Supreme Court applies a number of tests to determine whether a retroactive statute is constitutional. Their criteria are listed below.
Note that the proposed elimination of the three-mile wide Super Slab corridor does not prevent the company from building the toll road, it just changes the procedure. Statutes which only effect procedures are not retrospective, they are constitutional. I've highlighted that and a few other relevant parts.
It seems to be only the proponents of this bill warning of a lawsuit. During committee testimony this year the Super Slab lawyer was asked if they would sue if their corridor were eliminated.
This is the section of a 2006 Colorado Supreme Court case which explains the criteria for determining whether a retroactive statute is unconstitutional. The case, City of Golden v. Parker, can be read at
www.courts.state.co.us/supct/opinions/2005/05SC282.pdf
III. Analysis
Under the Colorado Constitution, the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting any law that is “retrospective in its operation . . . .” Colo. Const. art. II, § 11.
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A. Retrospectivity
The general prohibition against retrospective legislation is intended to prevent any unfairness that might result from the application of new law to rights already in existence. In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 854 (Colo. 2002). Legislation is presumed to operate prospectively unless there is legislative intent to the contrary. Id. Retroactive application of a law, although disfavored, is not necessarily unconstitutional and may be permitted if the law at issue effects a change that is procedural or remedial. Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d 1053, 105657 (Colo. 1996). In order to distinguish legislation that is merely retroactive, we use the term “retrospective” only in regard to legislation that “impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 16 (Colo. 1993) (citations omitted)
We use a two-step inquiry to determine whether or not a law is retrospective in its operation. DeWitt, 54 P.3d at 854. First, we look to the legislative intent to determine whether the law is intended to operate retroactively. Id. We require a clear legislative intent that the law apply retroactively to overcome the presumption of prospectivity. Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 14. However, express language of retroactive application is not necessary to find that a law is intended to apply retroactively. Id.
If we find intent of retroactive application, the second step of the inquiry is to determine whether the retroactively applied law operates retrospectively. A law is retrospective if it either “(1) impairs a vested right, or (2) creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability . . . .” DeWitt, 54 P.3d at 855. We consider each of these prongs of the retrospectivity analysis in turn. In regard to the first prong, we have found that a right is vested only when it has an “independent existence.” People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Colo. 1993). A vested right may be derived from a statute or the common law, but “once it vests it is no longer dependent for its assertion upon the common law or statute under which it may have been acquired.” Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 15.
We do not employ a fixed formula or a brightline test for determining whether a right is vested. Id. at 17. Rather, we look to three factors: “(1) whether the public interest is advanced or retarded; (2) whether the statute gives effect to or defeats the bona fide intentions or reasonable expectations of the affected individuals; and (3) whether the statute surprises individuals who have relied on a contrary law.” DeWitt, 54 P.3d at 855.
A determination that retroactive application of a law impairs a vested right is not dispositive of the retrospectivity inquiry because such a finding “may be balanced against public health and safety concerns, the state’s police powers to regulate certain practices, as well as other public policy considerations.” Id. Retroactive application of a law that implicates a vested right is only permissible, however, if the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Id. In past cases, we have “appl[ied] a balancing test that weighs public interest and statutory objectives against reasonable expectations and substantial reliance.” Kuhn, 924 P.2d at 105960 (quoting Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 17).
If a vested right is not implicated, we consider the second prong of the analysis. Under this prong, “retrospectivity may result from the creation of a new obligation, imposition of a new duty, or attachment of a new disability with respect to” past transactions or considerations. Dewitt, 54 P.3d at 855. Application of a law is not deemed retrospective, however, “merely because the facts upon which it operates occurred before” its adoption. City of Greenwood Village, 3 P.3d at 445.
Because we review legislation with the presumption that it is constitutional, see, e.g., In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 991325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999), our cases have not often found a law retrospective. However, we have prohibited retrospective application of a statute when the reasonable expectations and substantial reliance of a party vested prior to the enactment of the statute. Kuhn, 924 P.2d at 1060 (statute could not be retrospectively applied to defeat attorneys’ right to court-ordered reasonable fee paid out of common fund).